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Tab C-2 → LN
E p. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6

Assessment: Soviet Union in the Middle East

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The primary Soviet objective in the Middle East/Persian Gulf region is to ensure the USSR of a prominent role in the political/military future of an area of critical strategic and economic importance. Thus, the Soviets are seeking to develop long-term policies which can protect and enhance their influence on a more durable basis with the states of the region. A corollary of this objective is to prevent a reintroduction of US military presence and political influence which eroded sharply with the fall of the Shah. The Soviets are probably pleased that the Iran/Iraq war has deflected the attention of the Islamic states and the international community more generally away from their continued military occupation of Afghanistan. Moscow may also be hopeful of using the conflict to ensure itself of a prominent role in whatever new arrangements might emerge from the war for the security of the Persian Gulf and its a oil supplies. However, the war carries with it important risks for Soviet policy, primarily because the USSR could ultimately be forced to choose between its longstanding ties with Iraq and its hopes for future influence in Iran.

The uncertainties surrounding the Iran/Iraq war may have

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RDS ☐ or XDS ☐ EXT. DATE OADR
TS AUTH. JR Burke REASON(S) memo of 5/15/95
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influenced the Soviet decision to go ahead with plans to sign a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Syria, despite the evident internal weakness of the Assad regime. While the treaty represents a major Soviet initiative in the area, it will not by itself protect Moscow's influence in the region and it could ultimately backfire on the Soviets. In the near term, the USSR will try to use the Iran/Iraq war to reinforce Arab and Iranian suspicion of the US and divert attention from aggressive Soviet behavior in Afghanistan and elsewhere in the region.

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Soviet-Syrian Treaty:

The text of the Soviet/Syrian treaty is similar to the [redacted] other treaties the USSR has signed with Third World states since 1971. The security provisions obligate both parties to consult and cooperate "in cases of the emergence of situations jeopardizing peace or security of one of the parties or posing

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"a threat to peace or violating peace and security in the whole world." Thus, the security commitments are vague and stop well short of an explicit Soviet guarantee to defend Syria or to prop up the Assad regime.

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SECRET Tab 1A
Tab 6-3

Department of State

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 STATE 281622

ENDS USING THAT AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE BE CALLED TO GUARANTEE THE SECURITY OF MIDDLE EAST AND PERSIAN GULF OIL SUPPLIES AND TO DECLARE THE INDIAN OCEAN A ZONE OF PEACE. ON MAY 18 THE WARSAW PACT POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE PROPOSED THE EXAMINATION -- POSSIBLY THROUGH THE UN -- OF LIMITATIONS ON MILITARY PRESENCE AND ACTIVITIES IN THE WORLD'S OCEANS "IN THE INTERESTS OF SECURING RELIABLE AND UNHINDERED USE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT INTERNATIONAL SEA LANES," THUS PUTTING THE ISSUE IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT. AFTER A LONG SILENCE ON THE SUBJECT, AN IZVESTIYA ARTICLE ON SEPTEMBER 17 RECALLED THE WARSAW PACT PROPOSAL AND ACCUSED THE WEST OF HAVING IGNORED AN IMPORTANT OPPORTUNITY TO ENSURE THE SECURITY OF ITS OIL SUPPLIES. ANOTHER BRIEF REFERENCE TO THE WARSAW PACT PROPOSAL APPEARED IN A SOVIET RADIO BROADCAST OF OCTOBER 12.

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NODIS REVIEW

Cat. A - Caption removed; transferred to O/FADRC
Cat. B - [illegible] with additional access controlled by S/S
Caption and custody retained by S/S

Reviewed by: [illegible]
Date: 17 Sept 1987

R 232341Z OCT 87 ZFF
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL NATO CAPITALS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE
INDIAN OCEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY DUBLIN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BERN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 281622

EXDIS, MADRID FOR MODEL USCC

E.O. 12065: RDS-3 10/21/00 (CHRISTOPHER, WARREN)

TAGS: PEPR, UR, IZ, IR, US
SUBJECT: CONTINGENCY GUIDANCE ON PROPOSALS FOR EAST/WEST SECURITY GUARANTEES IN PERSIAN GULF
REF: STATE 256447
INDIAN OCEAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS (USCC AS INFORMATION)

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. AS WAR IN PERSIAN GULF DRAGS ON, WE BELIEVE THAT VARIOUS SCHEMES FOR JOINT EAST/WEST MEDIATION OF IRAN/IRAQ CONFLICT OR FOR POST-WAR SECURITY OF PERSIAN GULF MAY BE PROPOSED. IN PARTICULAR, THE SOVIETS THEMSELVES MIGHT USE THE CURRENT HOSTILITIES TO RESURRECT OR ADVANCE MORE FORMALLY THEIR OWN PROPOSAL FOR EAST/WEST NEGOTIATIONS ON THIS SUBJECT. PROPOSALS OF THIS TYPE MIGHT ALSO BE ADVANCED BY EUROPEANS OR OTHERS WHO ARE CONCERNED FOR THE SECURITY OF PERSIAN GULF OIL SUPPLIES AND TRANSPORTATION ROUTES. THIS CABLE PROVIDES BACKGROUND ON THE SOVIET PROPOSALS AND GUIDANCE FOR USE OF POSTS WHICH MAY HAVE TO RESPOND TO INQUIRIES ON THE SUBJECT.

3. BACKGROUND ON SOVIET PROPOSALS: DURING A FEBRUARY 22 MOSCOW SPEECH, BREZHNEV ACKNOWLEDGED THAT U.S. CONCERNS FOR THE SECURITY OF THE OIL ROUTES WERE

"UNDERSTANDABLE," THOUGH HE ASSERTED THAT THIS COULD NOT BE ACHIEVED BY TURNING THE REGION INTO A "POWDER KEG." FOLLOWING BREZHNEV'S LEAD, IZVESTIYA ANALYST MIKHAIL PORTNOVOY, ON FEBRUARY 28, ELABORATED ON THE THEME OF THE PHYSICAL VULNERABILITY OF MIDDLE EASTERN OIL SUPPLIES AND PROPOSED THAT NEGOTIATIONS ON THE SECURITY OF OIL TRANSPORTATION ROUTES BE DISCUSSED AT A CONFERENCE ON ENERGY WITHIN THE CSCE FRAMEWORK. PORTNOVOY SUGGESTED THAT THE 1975 HELSINKI FINAL ACT SIGNATORIES DRAW UP OUT "APPROPRIATE GUARANTEES" WHICH WOULD BE FORWARDED TO THE UNITED NATIONS FOR APPROVAL.

4. THE PORTNOVOY PIECE WAS FOLLOWED BY OTHER ARTICLES

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Authorization of the Executive Secretary

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B-1 (a)(5)

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Tab B-4

PRESS GUIDANCE October 14, 1980

SOVIET ARMS SUPPLIES TO IRAQ/IRAQ WAR

Question: What are the Soviets doing to supply arms to the belligerents in the Iran/Iraq War?

Answer: We cannot confirm that the Soviets have provided any large quantity of military assistance to either side since the current conflict began. Soviet deliveries may be taking place but they have not played a critical role in the military operations of either Iran or Iraq. In the short term, deliveries of additional Soviet military hardware would not be essential to the operations of either Iran or Iraq.

Question: What about reports that the Soviets are using their East European allies or other surrogates to supply Iraq?

Answer: We cannot confirm these reports, but we are looking into them.

Question: Can you confirm that the Soviets have permitted Libya to use their air space for shipment of military supplies and equipment to Iran?

Answer: We cannot confirm these reports.

Question: Do Soviet arms shipments contradict the USSR's claims of neutrality and its calls for a negotiated settlement?

Answer: I have nothing to add to what the Spokesman said last week. Previously contracted military goods may well be in the

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pipeline for the Soviet Union to Iraq (as noted in answer above). There is obviously a difference between such deliveries and a major resupply effort. I repeat what was said last week: We do not favor any actions which prolong this conflict and increase the dangers of escalation.

Question: Have we discussed with the Soviets the question of military supply to Iran and Iraq?

Answer: We have made clear to the Soviets at high levels on a number of occasions our views on this subject emphasizing that both sides should do everything possible to keep the conflict from spreading and to bring about the earliest possible cessation of hostilities.

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INFO OCT-00 EA-10 ADS-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-10 L-03
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NSO-00 ICAE-00 IME-00 /077 R

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Tab C

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Tab C-1

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Reviewed by: [redacted]

Date: 17 Sept 19 87

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Department of State Tab C-2

TELEGRAM

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS STATE 298397

E.O. 12065: N/A

TAGS: PINS, PORS, IR, UR, US

SUBJECT: EXCERPTS FROM NVOI BROADCASTS ON HOSTAGES

1. THERE FOLLOW EXCERPTS FROM RECENT BROADCASTS BY "CLANDESTINE" NATIONAL VOICE OF IRAN.

2. OCTOBER 23 BROADCAST: QUOTE. DURING THE LAST ONE OR TWO DAYS, THE TONE OF U.S. OFFICIALS TOWARD OUR COUNTRY HAS OUTWARDLY ALSO CHANGED TO THE EXTENT THAT BOTH CARTER AND MUSKIE HAVE DECLARED THAT IF IRAN RELEASES THE HOSTAGES, THE UNITED STATES IS READY TO REACT POSITIVELY. CARTER HAS SAID THAT SHOULD IRAN RELEASE THE HOSTAGES, HE WILL UNFREEZE IRAN'S ASSETS AND DEPOSITS WHICH AMOUNT TO SEVERAL BILLIONS OF DOLLARS, WILL LIFT THE ECONOMIC EMBARGO AND WILL TAKE STEPS TO NORMALIZE TRADE RELATIONS WITH IRAN IN THE FUTURE. NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT BY THIS HYPOCRITICAL STATEMENT MR. CARTER, SHOULD HIS PLANS BE FULFILLED, WANTS TO GAIN THE CONFIDENCE OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE FOR HIS BANKRUPT POLICY DURING THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, WE SHOULD NOT OVERLOOK THE FACT THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS PINNED ITS HOPES ON CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS IN OUR COUNTRY WHOHAVEA RECORD OF GOOD SERVICE TO WASHINGTON. WITHOUT DOUBT, FOR AMERICAN OFFICIALS THE

LIVES OF THE SPY HOSTAGES ARE NOT WORTH A CENT. FOR AMERICA THE PROBLEM OF THE HOSTAGES IS NOT THE ISSUE, RATHER THE ISSUE IS THE REGAINING OF IRAN. END QUOTE.

3. OCTOBER 26 BROADCAST: QUOTE. THE U.S. MILITARY ONSLAUGHT IN TABAS, ALLEGEDLY TO RESCUE THE HOSTAGES, WAS ONE OF THE MORE RECENT EXAMPLES OF THIS IMPERIALIST USURPER'S VIOLATING A COUNTRY'S INDEPENDENCE. U.S. HELI-COPTERS AND PLANES ARE INDULGING IN OVERT VIOLATION OF OUR TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, WITH THE HELP OF NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES LIKE PAKISTAN, SAUDI ARABIA, EGYPT AND OMAN, AND HAVE VIOLATED BASIC INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS IN TRYING TO TOPPLE OUR ISLAMIC REGIME AND TO FORCE A U.S.-ORIENTED REGIME ON THE FREE PEOPLE OF IRAN. THEY HAVE CLEARLY COMMITTED AGGRESSION AGAINST OUR COUNTRY'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. THE LATEST EXAMPLE OF MACHIAVELLIAN US IMPERIALISM IS THE PLUNGING OF OUR NASCENT REPUBLIC INTO THE THROES OF CIVIL STRUGGLE. THESE ARE UNDENIABLE HISTORICAL FACTS THAT CANNOT BE CONCEALED BY THOSE WHO SUPPORT THE RETURN OF U.S. IMPERIALISM TO IRAN... TWENTY MONTHS HAVE ELAPSED SINCE THE INCEPTION OF OUR GLORIOUS REVOLUTION, AND DURING THIS PERIOD, WORLD-DEVOURING U.S. IMPERIALISM HAS ATTEMPTED TO BRING ABOUT A COUP D'ETAT 16 TIMES....THOSE WHO WANT THE RETURN OF U.S. IMPERIALISM TO IRAN ARE NOT SITTING IDLE IN THE MAJLIS. ... THESE ARE THE OBSEQUIOUS "MODERATES" WHO WANT THE RETURN OF U.S. IMPERIALISM TO IRAN. THEIR MAIN AIM IS TO SECURE THE RELEASE OF THE AMERICAN SPIES-CUM-HOSTAGES, AND THUS TO (DISMEMBER) THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN AND DESTROY THE FRUITS OF THE REVOLUTION THROUGH TREACHERY (WORDS INDISTINCT) AND TO WORK FOR THE COMEBACK OF THE UNITED STATES. END QUOTE.

4. OCTOBER 27 BROADCAST: QUOTE. ON SEPTEMBER 14 THIS COMMISSION PRESENTED A REPORT TO THE MAJLIS IN THIS CONNECTION. IN THIS REPORT IT IS SAID THAT IRAN'S ISLAMIC REVOLUTION IS THE INAUGURATOR OF A NEW PATH IN THE HISTORY OF MANKIND WHICH, GOD WILLING, WILL RESULT IN THE FINAL VICTORY OF THE MEEK OVER THE ARROGANT, AND THAT WORLD-DEVOURING AMERICA, AS THE ARCH SATAN AND AS THE EMBODIMENT OF WORLD ARROGANCE, IS THE GREATEST ENEMY OF OUR INDEPENDENCE AND GRANDEUR AND OF ALL THE MEEK OF THE WORLD. IT IS IN THIS CONNECTION THAT THE OCCUPATION OF THE U.S. SPY DEN, WHICH IN FACT WAS REGARDED AS THE MAIN CENTER OF RULE OVER THE FATE OF THE MUSLIM NATION OF IRAN AND THE BASE OF U.S. AGGRESSION IN THE REGION, DERIVES ITS REAL MEANING AND CONTEXT...

THE PROBLEM OF THE HOSTAGES SHOULD ONLY BE REVIEWED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF RELATIONS WITH WORLD-DEVOURING AMERICA AS THE ARCHSATAN AND AS THE EMBODIMENT OF WORLD ARROGANCE AND AS THE GREATEST ENEMY OF OUR INDEPENDENCE AND GRANDEUR AND OF ALL THE MEEK OF THE WORLD... THE STATEMENT OF A GREAT NUMBER OF OFFICIALS AND OF THE LEADERS OF THE REVOLUTION THAT AMERICA WANTS IRAN NOT THE HOSTAGES IS CORRECT AND REALISTIC... THE JUST EXPECTATION OF THE IRANIAN NATION FROM THE ISLAMIC CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY IS THAT THEY RESOLVE THE PROBLEM OF THE HOSTAGES WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE ANTI-IMPERIALIST AND ANTI-AMERICAN POLICY OF THE IMAM OF THE NATION. END QUOTE. MUSKIE

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Tab C-3

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

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER

Ch VIII
Tab C-4

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EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND DETENTE

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has cast a pall over East-West relations. While the basic structure of East-West relations has survived, the Western response has demonstrated that the detente process is not geographically divisible, and that the burden is on Moscow to reestablish conditions for East-West progress in the period ahead.

The U.S. Objective

The United States inevitably took the major role in defining the West's reaction to the invasion of Afghanistan. The measures taken by President Carter in January imposed serious costs on the Soviets. But the aim of these measures was to influence Soviet behavior in ways that would make the resumption of more constructive relations possible, and in the meantime to preserve the basic framework of the East-West relationship. We recognized that such a measured response was in our interests -- and the interests of our closest allies in Europe and elsewhere.

In the wake of the invasion we therefore reaffirmed our commitment to the arms control process. We maintained a high-level dialogue with the Soviet leadership to minimize chances of misunderstanding or miscalculation. We continued our rapprochement with the nations of Eastern Europe, who had had no role in the Soviet actions in Afghanistan. And we made clear we would continue to support and actively participate in the CSCE process.

The Allies

There has been general agreement among our allies and ourselves on the objectives of our policies toward the East after Afghanistan. The Europeans recognized the threat posed by the invasion, and its inconsistency with the Helsinki Final Act. They appreciated the need to take measures to deter future Soviet adventures and took the initiative in defending Afghanistan's right to self-determination.

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There have been differences -- some of them widely publicized -- over the precise mix of U.S. and allied efforts in response to the invasion, and over the tactics best suited to attain our common objectives. But intensive consultations since January have kept our differences within bounds. And we have deprived the Soviets of their main objective -- Western acceptance of a fait accompli in Afghanistan.

The Soviet Approach

The Soviets have sought to play on Europe's desire to preserve and expand the material and human benefits of detente. In bilateral exchanges with Giscard and Schmidt, and in an aggressive, often strident, media campaign, Moscow has sought to shift the focus of East-West dialogue from Afghanistan to issues the Soviets believe will be attractive to the Europeans -- especially disarmament issues.

The Soviets have portrayed the U.S. as a traitor to detente, intent on whipping up East-West tensions and regaining lost military superiority, regardless of the impact of such policies on Europe. Moscow has meanwhile donned the mantle of detente and European arms control. The Soviet decision to negotiate on TNF in Europe, their recent behavior in MBFR, and their advocacy of a Conference on Disarmament and Military Detente in Europe have lent the appearance of substance to their claims.

The Importance of Madrid

The CSCE Review Conference in Madrid, which convenes November 11, will be the most visible East-West event since Afghanistan. Madrid is seen by both sides as both an opportunity and a challenge.

The United States and its Allies have insisted on a full review of implementation of all provisions of the Helsinki Final Act. We have made clear that while we hope for a business-like and pragmatic atmosphere, we expect to discuss Afghanistan, as well as other Soviet human rights violations.

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The Soviets have emphasized the need for progress at Madrid in the area of "military detente." Many Europeans also wish to see progress on security issues at Madrid. The French, for example, have proposed and received widespread Allied support for a Conference on Disarmament in Europe. If mandated at Madrid, the CDE could involve a CSCE-related expert meeting addressing stringent measures to constrain military activities in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. It might also seek to develop militarily significant, verifiable confidence building measures (CBM's). Such an outcome would be in the Western interest. We are not fully convinced, however, that Western support for a special CSCE meeting on this topic would be timely. At the same time, we wish to avoid giving the Soviets the opportunity to pose as the sole champion of arms control.

On human rights, the Soviets have made clear that they are prepared to respond in kind to Western allegations of violations. They have indicated they will be prepared to make concessions in other areas (e.g., family reunification and visa practices) in exchange for Western restraint on human rights criticism and progress on security issues of concern to them.

Other Activities

As preparations for Madrid continue, we are achieving our objective of keeping intact the essence of the East-West relationship in the wake of Afghanistan. In the disarmament sphere, we are exploring with the Soviets and our Allies modalities for beginning preliminary discussions on Theatre Nuclear Forces in Europe. Soviet charges of foot-dragging are ironic in view of their 6 month refusal to accept NATO's negotiating offer. We remain at the negotiating table in such fora as the UNCD, the MBFR talks, and discussions on a Comprehensive Test Ban. We remain committed to the SALT process, and have assured our allies that we will seek ratification as soon as the votes are there.

Our efforts in other areas continue to bear fruit. Our relations with the countries of Eastern Europe are in general better than at any time in the past. Recent developments in Poland, however, pose a serious test to the commitments embodied in the Helsinki Accords.

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In conclusion, Afghanistan remains a major obstacle to improved East-West relations. At present there seems little prospect of an early solution to the problem. It is therefore as important as ever to keep pressure on the Soviet Union to withdraw from Afghanistan and allow it to exercise its right of self-determination. The East-West framework nonetheless remains intact, and capable of supporting further progress when changes in Soviet attitudes and behavior make that possible.

August 28, 1980

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BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

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Reviewed by: John Brogan
Date: 17 Sept 1984

SECRET/SENSITIVE (NODIS ATTACHMENT)

TO: The Secretary

FROM: EUR - George S. Vest
PM - Reginald Bartholomew
S/MS - Marshall Shulman

Subject: Your Meeting with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin, 9:30 a.m., September 13.

SUMMARY: You will want to hear Dobrynin's impressions of his recent consultations in Moscow and will wish to convey to him the specific details of our proposals for starting the preliminary exchanges on TNF. You will want to be prepared to respond briefly to any questions along the lines of those raised earlier by Gromyko. You may wish to reemphasize the importance we attach to mutual restraint in Poland.

CHECKLIST

I. Objectives:

-- To obtain a read-out from Dobrynin on his consultations in Moscow.

-- To convey our views on timing, venue and modalities for beginning TNF preliminary exchanges.

-- To be prepared to deal with the questions Gromyko has posed on the proposed scope of the preliminary exchanges, in the event they are raised.

-- To point out the importance we attach to mutual restraint in dealing with the Polish situation.

II. Participants:

US	USSR
The Secretary Robert L. Barry, DAS/EUR	Ambassador Dobrynin

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The Classification/Declassification Center (A/CDC) conducts mandatory declassification/Freedom of Information Act reviews. It is also responsible for the systematic review for declassification of Departmental records at 20 years.

The Office of Communications (A/OC) is responsible for providing the worldwide communications system for the Department and for providing communications support to other foreign affairs agencies.

The Office of Foreign Buildings (A/FBO) is responsible for all overseas U.S. Government, non-military command buildings which are owned or leased. A/FBO has broad authority to negotiate the terms of its contracts overseas for construction, acquisition, leasing, and exchange of foreign properties as well as alterations and repair. A/FBO is also actively involved in the planning and implementation of architectural changes to enhance security at our high-risk overseas posts.

The Information Systems Office (A/ISO) operates the Department's major information management systems in the United States and overseas and is responsible for the development and implementation of the minicomputer and word processing programs.

The Office of Operations (A/OPR) administers a broad scope of services and programs both domestically and at our overseas posts including the overseas school program, the Privacy and Freedom of Information Acts, procurement policies, travel and transportation, space management and building maintenance, audio-visual and publication services, the Central Foreign Policy File and the provision of interpreting and translating services in forty languages.

The Office of Security (A/SY) is responsible for protection against traditional security threats domestically and overseas and in more recent years, against terrorist attacks. A/SY is presently involved in the planning and implementation of security upgrades at our high-risk overseas posts. Other responsibilities range from the investigation and clearance of job applicants to the development of technical equipment and procedures to counter electronic penetration efforts by hostile powers. A/SY provides personal protection to the Secretary and to visiting foreign dignitaries (including their families) below the rank of head of state against whom an identifiable security threat is believed to exist.

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There are also seven special offices and staffs which report directly to the Assistant Secretary: the Executive Office (A/EX); the Allowances Staff (A/ALS); the Special Programs and Liaison Staff (A/SPL), charged with coordinating and implementing security improvements at high-risk posts; the Safety Program (A/SAF); the Office of Overseas Schools (A/OS); the Art in Embassies Staff (A/ART); and the International Center Project (A/ICP).*

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III. Setting: Dobrynin returned to Washington September 10 from nearly two months leave in the Soviet Union. While there he will have consulted with the top Soviet leadership and will undoubtedly wish to share his impressions with you.

IV. DISCUSSION OF OBJECTIVES:

1. Dobrynin's Impressions: You may wish to open the meeting by inviting Dobrynin to share any impressions arising out of his extended leave in the Soviet Union and high-level consultations in Moscow. His presentation may lead into a discussion of the issues below.

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